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Coalitions for Climate Cooperation.
A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Post 2012 Climate Policy

Background and Objectives :: Contents and Topics :: Agenda :: Location :: Secretariat :: Papers and Presentations :: Summary


The International Workshop on Coalitions for Climate Cooperation. A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Post 2012 Climate Policy, organised by the International Center for Climate Governance (ICCG) and by the Centro Euro Mediterraneo per i Cambiamenti Climatici (CMCC) in cooperation with ETH Zürich, will be held in Venice, on June 15^th - 16^th, 2009, and will take place in the magnificent scenario of the Fondazione Giorgio Cini.

The goal of keeping climate change to manageable levels (e.g. limiting global average temperature increase to less than 2°-3°C compared to pre-industrial levels) cannot be achieved by a single country. Global action and cooperation are necessary, yet some countries, in both the developed and developing world, have been reluctant to adopt binding emission reduction commitments. Limited participation in climate change policy agreements vitiates the effectiveness of actions taken by countries implementing emission reductions, and it magnifies the global costs of climate stabilization. Starting from the current debate on the design of mechanisms to enhance participation in climate control cooperative efforts, this workshop aims to bring a broad audience of selected international researchers working in this field, albeit from different perspectives. A diversity of viewpoints will promote the exchange of recent research and may lead to concrete policy proposals, as well as opportunities for subsequent collaboration.

The workshop is structured around four main sessions, each composed by three papers and an extensive discussion in order to provide enough time for a in depth presentation of each participant's research. Topics that papers could cover are:

i. Analysis of basic participation incentives (marginal abatement costs and damages) in this a future decades (possibly accounting for technical change and spillovers).

ii. Main lessons for future climate negotiations coming from game-theoretic models.

iii. Static and dynamic analysis of coalition formation (possibly accounting for other factors affecting interactions among players such as trade, finance, terrorism, technology, ...).

iv. Insights for the design of future climate agreements from existing numerical climate economy models.

Both theoretical and applied analysis and model improvements will be presented to shed light on the incentive structure behind climate negotiations and on the features of a possible future climate agreement.