Coalitions and climate: towards alternative games
At the beginning of June, the International Workshop on Coalitions for Climate Cooperation - organized jointly by ICCG, FEEM, CMCC and ETH and held in Venice on the Island of San Giorgio Maggiore - focused on a game-theoretic analisys of post 2012 climate change.
Climate change is a global externality, hence limited participation in climate change policy agreements vitiates the effectiveness of actions taken by countries implementing emission reductions, and it magnifies the global costs of climate stabilization.
Game theory is the most appropriate framework to analyse what incentive each country faces and what would be the corrective set of actions required for a successful international agreement on climate cooperation. The Workshop overarching objective is to show how analytical and calibrated game theoretic models can contribute to these topical questions. Some crucial cross cutting themes have received specific attention:
- the role of innovation and how knowledge transfers could be used to increase participation in climate agreement;
- uncertainty and how it affects the stability of coalitions;
- international transfers, how they can sustain a broader cooperative effort and what they imply for equity and fairness;
- finally, the role of leakage and the potentials of trade barriers in improving the stability of international environmental agreements.
More on this Workshop: Background and Objectives :: Contents and Topics :: Agenda :: Location :: Secretariat :: Papers and Presentations
For questions and comments on this Workshop, please contact: valentina.bosetti@feem.it
